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作者：Blume, Lawrence; Easley, David; Halpern, Joseph Y.
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University; Cornell University
摘要：In most contemporary approaches to decision making under uncertainty, a decision problem is described by a set of states and set of outcomes, and a rich set of acts, which are functions from states to outcomes over which the decision maker (DM) has preferences. Many interesting decision problems, however, do not come with a state space and an outcome space. Indeed, in complex problems it is often far from clear what the state and outcome spaces would be. We present an alternative foundation fo...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Lindberg, Per Olov; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Royal Institute of Technology; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We prove that a random choice rule satisfies Luce's Choice Axiom if and only if its support is a choice correspondence that satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, thus it consists of alternatives that are optimal according to some preference, and then random choice occurs according to a tie-breaking mechanism among such alternatives that satisfies Renyi's Conditioning Axiom. Our result shows that the Choice Axiom is, in a precise formal sense, a probabilistic version of the Weak Axio...
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作者：Ngangoue, M. Kathleen
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This experiment studies belief updating under ambiguity, using subjects' bid and ask prices for an asset with ambiguous payoff distribution. Bid and ask quotes allow for distinguishing between the two main paradigms of updating under ambiguity-full Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating. We find substantial heterogeneity in subjects' reaction to information. The majority of subjects (54%) chose quotes that were in line with full Bayesian updating, while another, non-negligible, grou...
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作者：Evans, David; Evans, George W.; McGough, Bruce
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of St Andrews
摘要：We consider boundedly-rational agents in McCall's model of intertemporal job search. Agents update over time their perception of the value of waiting for an additional job offer using value-function learning. A first-principles argument applied to a stationary environment demonstrates asymptotic convergence to fully optimal decision-making. In environments with actual or possible structural change our agents are assumed to discount past data. Using simulations, we consider a change in unemploy...
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作者：Lopez-Pintado, Dunia; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.
作者单位：Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universidad de Malaga
摘要：We study the role of competitiveness, via interpersonal comparisons, in a society or a large organization. We consider a dynamic model of effort provision. Agents gain an extra utility by producing an outcome above a comparison threshold derived from the outcomes of their reference group in a random network. There are two different sources of competitiveness: the stringency of the comparison threshold and the weight given to relative performance in the utility function. We find that these two ...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Shlomov, Segev
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We introduce the class of virtually additive non-Bayesian learning heuristics to aggregating beliefs in social networks. A virtually additive heuristic is characterized by a single function that maps a belief to a real number that represents the virtual belief. To aggregate beliefs, an agent simply sums up all the virtual beliefs of his neighbors to obtain his new virtual belief. This class of heuristics determines whether robust learning, by any naive heuristic, is possible. That is, we show ...
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作者：Stanca, Lorenzo
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study the ex-ante aggregation of preferences of Bayesian agents in a purely subjective framework. I relax the assumption of a Bayesian social preference while keeping the Pareto condition. Under a simple axiom that relates society's preference to those of the agents, I obtain an additively separable representation of society's preference. Adding an ambiguity aversion axiom I obtain a representation that resembles the Smooth Ambiguity Criterion of Klibanoff et al. (2005). I then briefly consi...
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作者：Tang, Rui; Zhang, Mu
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Princeton University
摘要：This paper studies the implementation problem of a mechanism designer with ambiguity averse agents. The mechanism designer, desiring to implement a choice correspondence, can create ambiguity for agents by committing to multiple allocation rules and transfer schemes without revealing which one to use. By extending the cyclical monotonicity condition from choice functions to choice correspondences, we show that the condition can fully characterize implementable choice correspondences. We then s...
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作者：Eichberger, Juergen; Pasichnichenko, Illia
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Bristol
摘要：In this paper, we study choice under uncertainty with belief functions. Belief functions can capture partial information by describing what is objectively known about the probabilities of events. State-contingent acts together with a belief function over states induce belief functions over outcomes. We assume that decision makers have preferences over belief functions that reflect both their valuation of outcomes and the information available about the likelihood of outcomes. We provide axioms...
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作者：Qiu, Wenfeng; Ahn, David S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Related decisions are often observed in isolation without direct measurement of correlation in beliefs across state spaces or complementarity in tastes across prize spaces. We introduce a novel model with two decision problems with distinct states and prizes, which we call small worlds, without observation of bets that are contingent on the realization of both worlds. We characterize an appropriate version of subjective expected utility, where choices are made as if there is a joint distributi...
