Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calford, Evan M.
• 署名单位: Australian National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105326
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Ambiguity aversion; Mixed strategies; game theory

摘要

We study the use of mixed strategies in games by ambiguity averse agents with a preference for ran-domization. Applying the decision theoretic model of Saito (2015) to games, we establish that the set of rationalizable strategies grows larger as preference for randomization weakens. An agent's preference for randomization is partially observable: given the behavior of an agent in a game, we can determine an upper bound on the strength of randomization preference for that agent. Notably, data in previous experiments on ambiguity aversion in games is not consistent with a maximal preference for randomization for approxi-mately 30% of subjects. (c) 2021 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).