Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by cheap pre-play procedures
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ben-Porath, E
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2397
发表日期：
1998
页码：
108-122
关键词：
摘要：
Let P be a correlated equilibrium distribution on the set of outcomes of a fame G. Can P be implemented by some cheap pre-play procedure that does not involve a mediator? It is shown that if there are two distinct Nash equilibrium payoffs for each player in G and if P is rational (that is, consists of probabilities which are rational numbers) and generates for each player i an expected payoff which is above her worst Nash equilibrium payoff, then P can be virtually implemented in a sequential equilibrium of an extended Fame which is generated by adding a cheap pre-play phase. (C) 1998 Academic Press.