Protective and prudent behaviour in games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Fiestras-Janeiro, G; Borm, P; van Megen, F
署名单位：
Universidade de Vigo; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2338
发表日期：
1998
页码：
167-175
关键词：
摘要：
This paper introduces the notions of protective and prudent equilibria in the context of finite games in strategic form. It turns out that for games both notions are in fact equivalent. Moreover, it is shown that for matrix games the set of protective equilibria equals the set of proper equilibria. (C) 1998 Academic Press.