Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Marschak, T; Reichelstein, S
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2375
发表日期：
1998
页码：
106-141
关键词：
摘要：
Our model of network mechanisms studies individually addressed messages between any two members of an organization. For a given organizational objective function, wt examine communication costs, as measured by the number of message variables that agents need to exchange at equilibrium in order to achieve the desired action choices. Fur the class of objective functions we consider. price mechanisms are shown to minimize communication costs. IT cine requires the network tu be hierarchical, the organization may be forced to use more message variables. We identify the increase in communication tests associated with alternative hierarchies. (C) 1998 Academic Press.