Incomplete record-keeping and optimal payment arrangements
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Kocherlakota, N; Wallace, N
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2396
发表日期：
1998
页码：
272-289
关键词：
摘要：
We study a random-matching, absence-of-double-coinsidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways to keep track of what other people have done in the past: money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag. We study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past. (C) 1998 Academic Press.