Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Shimoji, M; Watson, J
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California San Diego
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2460
发表日期：
1998
页码：
161-195
关键词：
摘要：
We propose a notion of conditional dominance for games whose representations designate information sets. We prove that iterated conditional dominance is equivalent to extensive form rationalizability. We also conduct a general analysis of these concepts, yielding new insights on rationalizability and on the equivalence of solutions when applied to different representations of a game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C63, C72, C73. (C) 1998 Academic Press.