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作者：Guo, JT; Lansing, KJ
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：It has been shown that a one-sector real business cycle model with sufficient increasing returns in production may possess an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate business cycles driven by animal spirits of agents. This paper shows how an income tax schedule that exhibits a progressivity Feature can ensure saddle path stability in such a framework and thereby stabilize the economy against sunspot fluctuations. Conversely, an economy with a flat or regressive tax schedul...
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作者：Kalai, E; Ledyard, JO
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation folk theorem for patient implementers, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable. journal c...
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作者：Wallace, N
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
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作者：Pakes, A; Ericson, R
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：This paper considers two models of firm behavior that allow for heterogeneity among firms, idiosyncratic (or firm-specific) sources of uncertainty, and discrete outcomes (exit and/or entry). Both the characteristics of firm level panel data sets and the nature of the questions we characteristically ask of them imply that models with these features are likely to underlie most detailed empirical work on microdata sets. The models we consider are a Bayesian learning model due to Jovanovic [20], a...
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作者：Irmen, A; Thisse, JF
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Universite Catholique Louvain; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one-dimensional characteristics space. We show that standard results on prices and locations no longer hold when firms compete in a multi-characteristics space. In the location game with n characteristics, firms choose to maximize differentiation in the dominant characteristic and to minimize differentiation in the others when Ihc salience coefficient of the former is sufficiently large, Thus, the principle of minimum differenti...
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作者：Grant, S; Kajii, A; Polak, B
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Tsukuba; Yale University
摘要：Suppose agents value information not only to make contingent plans but also intrinsically. Wow are such attitudes toward information related to attitudes toward risk? We generalize the Kreps-Porteus recursive expected utility model, dropping both recursivity and expected utility. There is a geometric analogy between risk and information. We characterize intrinsic information loving, in general, by a substitution property analogous to multivariate risk loving; and, for smooth preferences, by th...
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作者：Kerschbamer, R; Maderner, N
作者单位：University of Vienna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies a discrete formulation of the screening model with type-dependent reservation utilities. II closes the pap between various pooling results derived in continuous-type models and the separating results obtained for the binary case. We show that binary models do not capture the most interesting features of general models with countervailing incentives. However, as soon as at least three types are introduced all interesting results of the continuum case can be replicated in a di...
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作者：Ma, JP
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Camden
摘要：This paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agents is initially endowed with a finite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the equivalence theorem of the core and the competitive equilibrium may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in the standard manner. We provide an alternative definition of the coalitional form game to resolve this problem so that the balancedness of the new defined game p...
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作者：Grandmont, JM
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
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作者：Bottazzi, JM; Hens, T; Loffler, A
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; University of Bielefeld; Free University of Berlin
摘要：We demonstrate that in a CAPM economy Homogeneity, Walras' Law, and the Tobin Separation Property characterize market demand on finite sets of prices. Consequently, for any number n there exist CAPM economies which have at least n equilibria and hence have n different beta pricing formulas. Endowment perturbations in these economies cannot decrease the number of equilibria below n. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
