Pollution claim settlements under correlated information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Pesendorfer, M
署名单位：
Yale University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2374
发表日期：
1998
页码：
72-105
关键词：
摘要：
Agents have to decide whether a polluting plant will be operated or not. Agents' disutility (cost) from pollution is privately known, but correlated across agents. Incentive compatible mechanisms are characterized under the assumption that transfer payments are non-negative. The implementability constraint is similar to the independence case, except that virtual utilities are diminished by a factor due to the correlation of agents' types. As correlation vanishes, the implementability constraint approaches the implementability constraint of the independent types environment. It is established that the free-riding problem is relaxed as the number of agents increases. With many agents, ex post efficiency is achievable under ex ante budget balance. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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