Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Govindan, S; Robson, AJ
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2443
发表日期：
1998
页码：
451-457
关键词：
摘要：
Gul and Pearce argue that forward induction has much less power as an equilibrium refinement than is generally supposed. The present comment raises the issue: What does admissibility imply for Gul and Pearce's analysis? In a key example, the precise equilibrium constructed by Gul and Pearce depends on a strategy which is not admissible. Even if ali equilibria are considered, it is not possible to preserve the Gul and Pearce results under admissibility. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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