Evolution with changing mutation rates
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Robles, J
署名单位：
University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2382
发表日期：
1998
页码：
207-223
关键词：
摘要：
This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is Found that if behavior is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run equilibrium for the game. However, conditions for ergodicity become increasingly restrictive as population size increases. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
来源URL：