Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Krasa, S
署名单位：
University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Vienna
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2535
发表日期：
1999
页码：
144-168
关键词：
摘要：
The paper considers an exchange economy with incomplete information in-which agents can retrade goods until all gains From trade are exhausted. Unimprovable allocations are defined to be those allocations from which agents would not wish to deviate either by retrading goods or by revealing further Information. The concept of unimprovability is then used to analyze a lemons market and an adverse selection insurance marker in which agents can renegotiate after information has been revealed. Finally, unimprovability is compared to different concepts of efficiency and to the concept of durability. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.