Starting small and renegotiation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Watson, J
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California San Diego
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.9999
发表日期：
1999
页码：
52-90
关键词：
摘要：
This paper develops a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually decide whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. An equilibrium in which the partners start small is studied and shown to be uniquely selected by a strong renegotiation condition. The characterization offers new insights into how relationships change as parties learn about each other and qualitative differences between situations of one- and two-sided incomplete information. In particular, slakes rise and types separate faster in the two-sided case. (C) 1999 Academic Press.