A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Epstein, LG; Peters, M
署名单位：
University of Toronto; University of Rochester
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2542
发表日期：
1999
页码：
119-160
关键词：
摘要：
In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is universal in that any specific model of the feasible set can be embedded in it. An equilibrium for a specific model is robust if and only if it is an equilibrium also for the universal set of mechanisms. A key to the construction is a language for describing mechanisms that is not tied to any preconceived notions of the nature of competition. Classification Numbers: D43, D89, C72. (C) 1999 Academic Press.