Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Neeman, Z; Orosel, GO
署名单位：
Boston University; University of Vienna
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2495
发表日期：
1999
页码：
91-121
关键词：
摘要：
We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers. We characterize three classes of equilibria that differ widely in their information aggregation properties and in the size of the rent the seller captures from the buyers. We compare the procedure of sequentially soliciting bids from the buyers to conducting an English auction for the object in terms of maximization of seller's revenue and demonstrate the superiority of the former. (C) 1999 Academic Press.