A tale of two mechanisms:: Student placement
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Balinski, M; Sönmez, T
署名单位：
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2469
发表日期：
1999
页码：
73-94
关键词：
摘要：
A new class of matching problems that models centralized college admissions via standardized tests is presented. The allocation mechanism that is used in real-life applications of this problem in Turkey is analyzed. It is shown that this mechanism, multi-category serial dictatorship, has a number of serious deficiencies, most notably inefficiency, vulnerability to manipulation, and the potential of penalizing students for improved test scores. Exploiting the relation between this class of problems and the celebrated college admissions model (Gale & Shapley [4]), an alternative mechanism is proposed that overcomes these deficiencies. This mechanism-the Gale-Shapley student optimal mechanism-is characterized as best in this context. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78. (C) 1999 Academic Press.