Markov equilibria in discounted stochastic games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chakrabarti, SK
署名单位：
Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2493
发表日期：
1999
页码：
294-327
关键词：
摘要：
We show that Markov perfect equilibrium exists for stochastic games which have transition probabilities that are Markovian and product measurable in past period's realisation of the states of nature and actions, and. norm continuous in past period's actions. The transition probabilities are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to some measure v(t) every period. We then show that if the stochastic game is stationary and the measure: v is nonatomic, then there exists a semi-Markov equilibrium strategy. Throughout the analysis the state space S is assumed to be a complete separable metric space and the action spaces Ai of the players are assumed to be compact metric spaces and invariant over time. The payoff is the usual sum of the discounted payoffs received every period. Journal of Economic Theory Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C72, C73, D81. (C) 1999 Academic Press.