Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harris, CJ; Stinchcombe, MB; Zame, WR
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; King's College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.008
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 208-224
• 关键词: Infinite games; Equilibrium existence; Finitely additive strategies; compactification; finite approximability of infinite games

摘要

Normal form games are nearly compact and continuous (NCC) if they can be understood as games played on strategy spaces that are dense subsets of the strategy spaces of larger compact games, with jointly continuous payoffs. There are intrinsic algebraic, measure theoretic, functional analysis, and finite approximability characterizations of NCC games. NCC games have finitely additive equilibria, and all their finitely additive equilibria are equivalent to countably additive equilibria on metric compactifications. The equilibrium set of an NCC game depends upper hemicontinuously on the specification of the game and contains only the limits of approximate equilibria of approximate games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.