Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mailath, GJ; Postlewaite, A; Samuelson, L
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.05.002
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 126-140
• 关键词: epsilon equilibrium; ex ante payoff; multistage game; Subgame perfect equilibrium

摘要

We examine contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within epsilon of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect epsilon-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.