An experimental study of costly coordination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goeree, JK; Holt, CA
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.006
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 349-364
• 关键词: Coordination games; stochastic potential; Logit equilibrium; out-of-sample prediction

摘要

This paper reports data for coordination game experiments with random matching. The experimental design is based on changes in an effort-cost parameter, which do not alter the set of Nash equilibria nor do they alter the predictions of adjustment theories based on imitation or best response dynamics. As expected, however, increasing the effort cost lowers effort levels. Maximization of a stochastic potential function, a concept that generalizes risk dominance to continuous games, predicts this reduction in efforts. An error parameter estimated from initial two-person, minimum-effort games is used to predict behavior in other three-person coordination games. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.