Core convergence with asymmetric information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
McLean, R; Postlewaite, A
署名单位：
University of Pennsylvania; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.005
发表日期：
2005
页码：
58-78
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economics. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.