A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Samet, D; Safra, Z
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 89-106
• 关键词: bargaining problems; ordinal utility; bargaining solutions

摘要

A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with respect to order-preserving transformations of utility. Shapley has constructed an ordinal, symmetric, efficient solution to three-player problems. Here, we extend Shapley's solution in two directions. First, we extend it to more than three players. Second, we show that this extension lends itself to the construction of a continuum of ordinal, symmetric, efficient solutions. The construction makes use of ordinal path-valued solutions that were suggested and studied by O'Neil et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 139-153]. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.