Strategic dropouts
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Orzach, R; Tauman, Y
署名单位：
Wayne State University; Tulane University; Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.006
发表日期：
2005
页码：
79-88
关键词：
摘要：
Following Spence, this note provides an education signaling model to explain the phenomenon of gifted entrepreneurs who acquire less education than ordinary individuals. Two types of individuals, ordinary and gifted, are considered. Each one of them can either convince an investor to fund his enterprise or approach a competitive job market. The probability that an ordinary individual succeeds to establish a successful enterprise is smaller than that of a gifted individual irrespective of his education level. The probability of an ordinary individual succeeding increases with the level of education. In a separating equilibrium gifted individuals curtail their eduction to a level below that of the ordinary ones. This happens if the value of a successful enterprise per dollar investment is sufficiently large, on the one hand, but not too large to guarantee that the expected value of an enterprise run by an educated ordinary entrepreneur falls below the investment cost, on the other. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.