Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Ockenfels, Axel; Roth, Alvin E.
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.010
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 297-320
• 关键词: internet auctions; Second price auctions; ebay; amazon; Sniping; market design

摘要

In second price Internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. We propose an internet auction model, in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and show that late bidding in a fixed deadline auction can occur at equilibrium in auctions both with private values and with uncertain, dependent values. Late bidding may also arise Out of equilibrium, as a best reply to incremental bidding. However, the strategic advantages of late bidding are severely attenuated in auctions that apply an automatic extension rule such as auctions conducted on Amazon. Field data show that there is more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon, and this difference grows with experience. We also study the incidence of multiple bidding, and its relation to late bidding. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.