A folk theorem for minority games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Renault, J; Scarlatti, S; Scarsini, M
• 署名单位: University of Turin; G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.013
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 208-230
• 关键词: Repeated games; imperfect monitoring; public signals

摘要

We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro (whence the name minority game). The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced. We show that in the infinitely repeated game any feasible payoff can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff, and as an almost sure equilibrium payoff. In particular we construct an inefficient equilibrium where, with probability one, all players choose the same room at almost all stages. This equilibrium is sustained by punishment phases which use, in an unusual way, the pure actions that were played before the start of the punishment. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.