Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Takahashi, S
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.012
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 231-247
• 关键词: common interest; pure coordination; perfect information; Subgame perfect equilibrium; asynchronous move; Repeated game; anti-folk theorem

摘要

We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster than K-1 as t -> infinity. We show that every subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is efficient in any tapering-off game with perfect information. Applications include asynchronously repeated games, repeated games of extensive form games, asymptotically finite horizon games, and asymptotically pure coordination games. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.