Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Asheim, GB; Perea, A
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.015
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 15-42
• 关键词: Extensive games; rationalizability

摘要

Within an epistemic model for two-player extensive games, we formalize the event that each player believes that his opponent chooses rationally at all information sets. Letting this event be common certain belief yields the concept of sequential rationalizability Adding preference for cautious behavior to this event likewise yields the concept of quasi-perfect rationalizability. These concepts are shown to (a) imply backward induction in generic perfect information games, and (b) be non-equilibrium analogues to sequential and quasi-perfect equilibrium, leading to epistemic characterizations of the latter concepts. Conditional beliefs are described by the novel concept of a system of conditional lexicographic probabilities. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.