Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Noussair, C; Silver, J
• 署名单位: Emory University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.005
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 189-206
• 关键词: All-pay; auction; experiment

摘要

This paper analyzes the behavior of single-unit all-pay auctions within the independent private values environment in the laboratory. We study revenue, individual bidding behavior, and efficiency, in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner-pay first-price sealed-bid auctions. We conclude that the all-pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium and the winner-pay auction. Bidders' decisions move closer to equilibrium levels over time in the auction. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.