Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, CM; Putterman, L
• 署名单位: Brown University; University of Rhode Island
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.007
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1-24
• 关键词: Public goods; collective action; experiment; PUNISHMENT; demand

摘要

The prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods. We ask whether the impulse to punish is unresponsive to the cost to the punisher, or whether, like other preferences, it interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand curve. In a series of experiments, we randomly vary the cost of reducing the earnings of other group members following voluntary contribution decisions. In our design, new groups are formed after each interaction and no subject faces any other more than once, so there is no strategic reason to punish. We nonetheless find significant levels of punishment, and we learn that both price and the extent to which the recipient's contribution is below the group mean are significant determinants of the quantity of punishment demanded. Moreover, punishment is mainly directed at free riders even when it costs nothing to the punisher. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.