Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chakraborty, I
• 署名单位: University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 31-46
• 关键词: Bundling; auctions; endogenous entry

摘要

A seller sells dissimilar objects while taking the auction rule as given. Should the seller sell the objects separately or as a bundle? Generally, when the number of bidders is small bundling helps to stimulate the competition and raise revenue. In this paper, we show that if entry is costly enough the process of endogenous participation generates sufficient competition to make bundling unnecessary in auctions. Thus whether a bundle auction generates a higher or a lower revenue ultimately depends first on the level of the entry costs and then, possibly, on the number of potential bidders. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.