Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hojman, DA; Szeidl, A
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.007
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 112-130
• 关键词: Network formation; stochastic stability; Scale effects; COORDINATION

摘要

This paper studies a social game where agents choose their partners as well as their actions. Players interact with direct and indirect neighbors in the endogenous network. We show that the architecture of any nontrivial Nash equilibrium is minimally connected, and equilibrium actions approximate a symmetric equilibrium of the underlying game. We apply the model to analyze stochastic stability in 2 x 2 coordination games. We find that long-run equilibrium selection depends on a trade-off between efficiency and risk dominance due to the presence of scale effects arising from network externalities. Our results suggest a general pattern of equilibrium selection. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.