Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: González-Díaz, J
• 署名单位: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 100-111
• 关键词: Repeated games; Nash equilibrium; folk theorem; finite horizon; Complete information

摘要

This paper characterizes the set of feasible payoffs of finitely repeated games with complete information that can be approximated arbitrarily closely by Nash equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.