p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tercieux, Olivier
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.004
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 371-384
• 关键词: set-valued concepts; incomplete information; refinements; Robustness; p-Dominance; Risk-dominance; higher order uncertainty

摘要

In this paper, we use p-best response sets-a. set-valued extension of p-dominance-in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information: if there exists a set S which is a p-best response set with Sigma(I)(i) (= 1) p(i) < 1, and there exists a unique correlated equilibrium mu* whose support is in S then mu* is a robust Nash equilibrium. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier Inc.