On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Masso, Jordi; de Barreda, Ines Moreno
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 467-484
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences; median voter; Feasibility constraints

摘要

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.