Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Du, Ninghua; Yang, Chun-Lei
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.002
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 361-375
• 关键词: Experiment; indirect reciprocity; trust; Reputation systems

摘要

Trust is an essential component of good social outcomes and effective economic performance. Reputation on the trustee's past behavior in the same role has proven to be greatly effective at raising the level of trust. In this study, we show that providing information on the trustee's past behavior as the trustor is equally effective as a reputation system. In fact, people still find it worthwhile to invest in a reputation as a trusting person, even though the immediate payoff for trusting is poor. This confirms the role of indirect reciprocity as a strategic notion based on reputation, whereby pro-social actions by one person towards a second person are sanctioned by a third party. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.