Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lippert, Steffen; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• 署名单位: Massey University; University of Auckland; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.010
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 202-217
• 关键词: Collusion; COMMUNICATION; Community enforcement; contagion; COOPERATION; multimarket contact; private monitoring; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; repeated games; reputation; Rumors; Social capital; Social collateral; social networks; Soft information; trust

摘要

We study networks of relations - groups of agents linked by several cooperative relationships - exploring equilibrium conditions under different network configurations and information structures. Relationships are the links through which soft information can flow, and the value of a network lies in its ability to enforce agreements that could not be sustained without the information and sanctioning power provided by other network members. The model explains why network closure is important; why stable subnetworks may inhibit more valuable larger networks; and why information flows and action choices cannot be analyzed separately. Contagion strategies are suboptimal here, as they inhibit information transmission, delaying punishments. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.