Match-fixing under competitive odds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bag, Parimal Kanti; Saha, Bibhas
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 318-344
• 关键词: Sports betting; Bookie; Punters; CORRUPTION; Match-fixing; lemons problem

摘要

Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the 'lemons' (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits but also admit match-fixing. When match-fixing occurs, it often involves bribery of only the strong team. The theoretical analysis is intended to address the problem of growing incidence of betting related corruption in world sports including cricket, horse races, tennis, soccer, basketball, wrestling, snooker, etc. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.