Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady
署名单位:
Tel Aviv University
刊物名称:
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN:
0899-8256
DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.005
发表日期:
2011
页码:
503-512
关键词:
bilateral trade
Multiple objects
Buyer-seller problem
bargaining
mechanism design
private values
摘要:
We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.