A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schmutzler, Armin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.008
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 212-223
• 关键词: Comparative statics; supermodularity; strategic complementarity; Quantal-response equilibrium; Level-k reasoning

摘要

The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative statics results for (i) the Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff functions, (ii) the quantal response equilibrium, (iii) level-k reasoning. I also relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection concepts. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.