-
作者：Lee, Gea M.
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：In this paper, two firms play an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game, and each firm has an agent who produces the firm's output and holds private information about production costs. The colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents' information. We develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information. We show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optima...
-
作者：Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Moreno, Diego; Shitovitz, Benyamin
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Hitotsubashi University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
摘要：We show that when firms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we also find some sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are possible. (C) 2009 Else...
-
作者：Wichardt, Philipp C.
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper proposes a bounded rationality approach to model equilibrium play in games. It is based on the observation that decision makers often do not seem to fully distinguish between different but seemingly similar decisions and tend to treat such similar decisions in a standardised/habitual way. To capture this, each player's information partition is derived from a similarity grouping of decisions based on the local structure of the game equality of available actions and analogy of locally...
-
作者：Bochet, Olivier; Sakai, Toyotaka
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Maastricht University; University of Bern
摘要：An allocation rule is securely implementable if it is strategy-proof and has no bad Nash equilibrium in its associated direct revelation game [Saijo, T., Sjostrom, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Econ. 2, 203-229. Original work published in RIETI Discussion Paper (03-E-019), 2003]. We study this implementability notion in allotment economies with single-peaked preferences [Sprumont, Y., 1991. The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of th...
-
作者：Castillo, Marco; Petrie, Ragan
作者单位：George Mason University
摘要：Using a laboratory experiment, we find evidence consistent with statistical discrimination in a public good and group formation game. In the game, payoff relevant information is presented to subjects, thereby making it costly to discriminate when choosing group members. We find that behavior is correlated with race and people use Face to predict behavior, However, race only matters when information on behavior is absent. These results are further confirmed when incentives are in place to encou...
-
作者：Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of York - UK
摘要：Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget. We show that this phenomenon can occur as an equilibrium of a non-cooperative bargaining game based on the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory ...
-
作者：Borgs, Christian; Chayes, Jennifer; Immorlica, Nicole; Kalai, Adam Tauman; Mirrokni, Vahab; Papadimitriou, Christos
作者单位：Microsoft; Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The Folk Theorem for repeated games suggests that finding Nash equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in one-shot games. In contrast, we show that the problem of finding any Nash equilibrium for a three-player infinitely-repeated game is as hard as it is in two-player one-shot games. More specifically, for any two-player game, we give a simple construction of a three-player game whose Nash equilibria (even under repetition) correspond to those of the one-shot two-player game. Combi...
-
作者：Hens, Thorsten; Vogt, Bodo
作者单位：Otto von Guericke University; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Zurich; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Using an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy as a basis, we argue that a monetary system can be more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the feedback of his choice to the stationary equilibrium. If, however, the participants do not play stationary strategies and some participants notoriously refuse to accept money, then due to negative reciprocity their be...
-
作者：Branas-Garza, Pablo; Cobo-Reyes, Ramon; Paz Espinosa, Maria; Jimenez, Natalia; Kovarik, Jaromir; Ponti, Giovanni
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; University of Granada; University of Basque Country
摘要：We report on a two-stage experiment in which (i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and (ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic, as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are positively correlated with the level of giving, even after controlling for framing and social distance, which have been shown to significantly affect giv...
-
作者：Alpern, Steve; Gal, Shmuel; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study a selection game between two committee members (the players). They interview candidates sequentially and have to decide, after each interview, whether to hire the candidate or to interview the next candidate. Each player can either accept or reject the candidate, and if he rejects the candidate while the other accepts her, he can cast a veto. The candidate is hired if accepted by at least one player and not vetoed. The total number of vetoes available for each player are fixed in adva...
