Committee design with endogenous participation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hahn, Volker
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.009
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 388-408
• 关键词: Committee decision-making; adverse selection; screening; efficiency wages; TRANSPARENCY; career concerns

摘要

We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts' decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages continuously lower the quality of experts on the committee. Second, and as a consequence of this, optimal committees involve low wages. Third, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Fourth, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.