Optimal dynamic information provision

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Renault, Jerome; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 329-349
• 关键词: Dynamic information provision; Optimal strategy; Greedy Algorithm; COMMITMENT

摘要

We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An advisor with commitment power decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term decisions. We deal with a stylized class of situations, in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action, and the payoff to the advisor only depends on the action chosen by the decision maker. The greedy disclosure policy is the policy which, at each stage, minimizes the amount of information being disclosed in that stage, under the constraint that it maximizes the current payoff of the advisor. We prove that the greedy policy is optimal in many cases - but not always. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.