Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Ramaekers, Eve
• 署名单位: Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Delhi; Yokohama National University; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.014
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 613-631
• 关键词: Implementation in undominated strategies; Partial honesty; Bounded mechanism; Pareto correspondence

摘要

We consider implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. We provide a complete characterization of the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable when agents are partially honest, in the sense that they have strict preferences for being sincere when truthfulness does not result in a worse outcome. As an application, we show that the Pareto correspondence is implemented by a finite mechanism. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.