Honesty and informal agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dufwenberg, Martin; Servatka, Maros; Vadovic, Radovan
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Carleton University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 269-285
• 关键词: AGREEMENTS; NEGOTIATIONS; COMMUNICATION; temptation; experiment; game theory

摘要

We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions - split-the-difference and deal-me-out - to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with 2 x 2 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner. (c) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.