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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：We propose an incomplete information version of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process. At each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some conjectures of the player. The conjecture has to put positive weight only on states, and types and actions of the other players which that type thinks possible, and actions of those types that have survived so far. We analyze some ...
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作者：Maas, Alexander; Goemans, Christopher; Manning, Dale; Kroll, Stephan; Brown, Thomas
作者单位：University of Idaho; Colorado State University System; Colorado State University Fort Collins; United States Department of Agriculture (USDA); United States Forest Service
摘要：Many common pool resources (CPRs) have tipping points stock levels below which the resource is permanently damaged or destroyed but the specific levels at which these thresholds are crossed are rarely known with certainty. We model a CPR in which uncertainty simultaneously creates a Prisoner's Dilemma and a Coordination Game. This model highlights a novel mechanism through which uncertainty incentivizes the overuse of a CPR. In the model, two Nash Equilibria exist, both of which lead to a Trag...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it i...
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作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Mitra, Manipushpak; Mukherjee, Conan
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Lund University; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Bombay
摘要：We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We analyze this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring, that includes the winner and the top (r - 1) losers. In the multiple units case, we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of ...
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作者：Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper addresses the question of existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in a class of dynamic games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation. General sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria are currently lacking in a number of interesting environments, e.g., models with non-convexities, consumption lower bounds, or an evolving state variable. The main result establishes existence of equilibrium under compactness and continuity condit...
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作者：Jiao, Zhenhua; Tian, Guoqiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that the deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for agents on the proposing side under the extended...
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作者：Collins, Sean M.; James, Duncan; Servatka, Mara; Woods, Daniel
作者单位：Fordham University; Fordham University; Macquarie University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：The operation of the posted offer market with advance production environment (Mestelman and Welland, 1988), appropriately parameterized, differs from that of the market entry game (Selten and Guth, 1982), appropriately presented, only in terms of price-setting. We establish the effect of this difference in price-setting on attainment of the competitive equilibrium allocation while controlling for effects relating to the presentation of the market entry game and to the stationarity or non-stati...
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作者：Bracha, Anat; Vesterlund, Lise
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：False inference may be drawn in asymmetric information environments where the type space is multi-dimensional and the analysis is restricted to only one of those dimensions. We demonstrate this by studying donation-visibility in a charitable-giving environment. Past studies show that donation-visibility increases giving and argue that this is consistent with donations signaling generosity or income and thereby improving donors' status. However, this explanation relies on status being one-dimen...
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作者：Li, Jiangtao; Tang, Rui
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; National University of Singapore
摘要：Motivated by the literature on random choice and in particular the random utility models, we extend the analysis in Bossert and Sprumont (2013) to include the possibility that players exhibit stochastic preferences over alternatives. We prove that every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hong, Fuhai; Lim, Wooyoung; Zhao, Xiaojian
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper experimentally explores how compositional grammars in artificial codes emerge and are sustained. In a communication game with no conflict of interest, the sender sends a message that is an arbitrary string from available symbols with no, prior meaning to indicate an abstract geometrical figure to the receiver. We find strong evidence from the laboratory for the emergence of compositional grammars in the subjects' common codes that facilitate learning efficiency. Moreover, when there...
