Sequential commitment games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Tennenholtz, Moshe
• 署名单位: Technion Israel Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.009
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 297-315
• 关键词: Commitment games; extensive-form games; Pareto efficiency

摘要

We consider an extensive-form game in which players have the option to commit to actions before the game is played. We focus on commitment procedures where players make voluntary irreversible commitments in a prescribed order over the decision nodes. We study whether such commitment procedures may lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes. Our main result is surprisingly positive: for two-player games, we introduce an order over the decision nodes for which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is Pareto-efficient for every strict preference of the players over the outcomes. We show that the above result does not hold for games with four players. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.