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作者：Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Graz
摘要：I study the implications of Wald's (1947) complete class theorem for decision making under Knightian uncertainty (or ambiguity). Suppose we call someone who uses Wald's approach to statistical decision making a Waldian. A Waldian may then have preferences over acts that are not in agreement with subjective expected utility but always chooses as if she was a subjective expected utility maximizer. In particular, even Wald's (1945) minmax decision rule is consistent with subjective expected utili...
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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study non-stationary markets in which traders are randomly matched to bargain over the price of a heterogeneous good or the terms of a partnership. The economy consists of a continuum of players drawn from a finite set of types. Players exogenously enter the market over time and exit upon trading. At every date, matching probabilities for each pair of types are determined by the endogenous distribution of trader types in the market. The balance of bargaining power at any stage depends on va...
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作者：Sanjurjo, Adam
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：Multiple attribute search is a central feature of economic life: we consider much more than price when purchasing a home, and more than wage when choosing a job. Nevertheless, while single attribute search problems have been studied extensively, little is known about optimal search in multiple attribute environments. I introduce a partial characterization of optimal sequential search in a problem with multiple searchable attributes and alternatives, no order restrictions on search, and full re...
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作者：Li, Yunan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper studies the revenue maximization problem in environments wherein buyers have interdependent values and correlated types. We show that (1) when the system of feasible sets is a matroid and buyer valuations satisfy a single-crossing condition, the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms with lazy reserves (VCG-L) are ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational; (2) if, in addition, the valuation distribution satisfies a generalized monotone hazard rate conditio...
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作者：Akerlof, Robert
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：People's values are a critical determinant of their behavior. But, how do values form and what causes them to change? This paper proposes a theory of value formation. In the model, agents choose values, motivated by economic considerations and, crucially, also by the desire for esteem. The comparative statics are driven by the following tension: agents obtain more esteem from peers if they conform in their choice of values; but they may obtain more self-esteem if they differentiate. This tensi...
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作者：Wellman, Michael P.; Sodomka, Eric; Greenwald, Amy
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Facebook Inc; Brown University
摘要：Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the outcome of other auctions; that is, bidders face an exposure problem. Previous works have tackled the exposure problem with heuristic strategies that employ probabilistic price predictions so-called price-prediction strategies. We introduce a concept of self-confirming prices, and show that within an independent private value model, Bayes-Nash equilibrium can be fully characteri...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Galichon, Alfred
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights ...
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作者：Lien, Jaimie W.; Zheng, Jie; Zhong, Xiaohan
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Tsinghua University
摘要：In a school choice mechanism, school priorities are often based on student exam scores, by which student true ability may not be perfectly revealed. An ex-post fair matching mechanism (for example, Serial Dictatorship) can be undesirable in that it is not exante fair: it may not match students with higher abilities to better schools, although it always matches students with higher scores to better schools. In this paper we consider a potential way of improving ex-ante fairness a Boston mechani...
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作者：Allouch, Nizar
作者单位：University of Kent
摘要：This paper investigates the welfare effect of income redistribution in the private provision of public goods on networks. We first show that the welfare effect of income redistribution is determined by Bonacich centrality. Then we develop an index based on the network structure of interactions, which, roughly speaking, measures the welfare effect of income redistribution confined to a component of contributors. The proposed index vanishes when applied to large components of contributors that d...
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作者：Dietzenbacher, Bas; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reser...
