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作者：Norman, Thomas W. L.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：In infinitely repeated games, Nachbar (1997, 2005) has shown that Bayesian learning of a restricted strategy set is inconsistent; the beliefs required to learn any element of such a set will lead best responses to lie outside of it in most games. But I establish here that Nash convergence of Bayesian learning requires only that optimal play (rather than any possible play) is learnable, and an appropriately modified notion of learnability is consistent in many of the games to which Nachbar's re...
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作者：Gori, Michele
作者单位：University of Florence
摘要：Lemma 20 in Gori (2021) is not correct. In this note we propose a new version of Lemma 20 and we discuss the impact of that new version on the other results in Gori (2021). Notation and definitions are as in Gori (2021). (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Saur, Marc P.; Schlatterer, Markus G.; Schmitt, Stefanie Y.
作者单位：Otto Friedrich University Bamberg; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：We analyze the implications of consumers' limited perception in a model of horizontal product differentiation. Consumers with limited perception do not necessarily notice all goods in the market. Limited perception thus offers a market segmentation into consumers who notice only one good and consumers who notice all goods. Our objective is to analyze whether less perception is harmful to consumers when firms use this segmentation to price discriminate. We show that product differentiation unde...
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作者：Bhattacharjee, Swagata
作者单位：Ashoka University
摘要：Outsourcing of research is commonly observed in knowledge-intensive industries such as biotech. We model innovation as an ambiguous stochastic process with dynamically consistent updating. We assume that the research labs are less ambiguity averse than the commercial firms. We characterize the optimal sequence of short-term contracts governing innovation, and show how it facilitates ambiguity-sharing. This ambiguity sharing agreement mitigates the dynamic moral hazard problem, resulting in mon...
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作者：Kinateder, Markus; Merlino, Luca Paolo
作者单位：University of Navarra; University of Antwerp
摘要：We introduce weighted links in a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. We find that the equilibrium predictions are sharper than when links are not weighted. In particular, active players form a complete core-periphery graph, where they are either in the core of interconnected players, or connected to every player in the core. Furthermore, a player's type is tightly related to her public good provision and her position in the network. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Castro, Francisco; Weintraub, Gabriel
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University
摘要：We compare the profit of the optimal third-degree price discrimination policy against a uniform pricing policy. A uniform pricing policy offers the same price to all segments of the market. Our main result establishes that for a broad class of third-degree price discrimination problems with concave profit functions (in the price space) and common support, a uniform price is guaranteed to achieve one half of the optimal monopoly profits. This profit bound holds for any number of segments and pr...
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作者：Bilo, Vittorio; Caragiannis, Ioannis; Flammini, Michele; Igarashi, Ayumi; Monaco, Gianpiero; Peters, Dominik; Vinci, Cosimo; Zwicker, William S.
作者单位：University of Salento; Aarhus University; Gran Sasso Science Institute (GSSI); Research Organization of Information & Systems (ROIS); National Institute of Informatics (NII) - Japan; University of L'Aquila; University of Toronto; Union College
摘要：We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph. If the graph is a path and the utility functions are monotonic over bundles, we show the existence of EF1 allocations for at most four agents, and the existence of EF2 allocations for any number of agents; our proofs involve discrete analogues of the Stromquist's moving-knife protocol and the Su-S...
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作者：Erkut, Hande
摘要：Experimental research on generosity has focused predominantly on behavior in the monetary domain, although many real-life decisions occur in the non-monetary domain. Investigating generosity preferences in the non-monetary domain is important for understanding a large class of situations ranging from effort provision at work to reducing individual CO2 emissions. This paper shows generosity differs between the monetary and non-monetary domains and that different social norms of allocation can p...
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作者：Bonifacio, Agustin G.; Guinazu, Nadia; Juarez, Noelia; Neme, Pablo; Oviedo, Jorge
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
摘要：In a many-to-one matching model, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings when firms' choice functions satisfy substitutability. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed worker. We show that this set has a lattice structure and define a Tarski operator on this lattice that models a re-equilibration process and has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sohn, Jin-yeong; Wu, Wenhao
作者单位：Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; ShanghaiTech University
摘要：We introduce the uncertainty of psychological motivation into a reciprocity model and explore its implications on behavior. More precisely, we assume that reciprocity sensitivities are subject to incomplete information and extend the Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium in extensive-form games (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) to a broader class of incomplete information games. We use this general framework to study many well-known games and find that uncertainty could either mitigate or stren...
