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作者：Kaufmann, Marc
摘要：I model individuals working on a long-term task who, due to projection bias, underestimate changes in marginal disutility. At the start of each day, when current marginal disutility is low, such individuals overestimate how much they will work, and as they grow tired from working, they plan to work less and less. Despite these fluctuating plans, when they face decreasing returns to effort, they work optimally, yet if they commit in advance, they overcommit. When facing increasing returns, they...
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作者：Fugger, Nicolas; Gretschko, Vitali; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Mannheim; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a two-period production project. The buyer lacks the commitment not to renegotiate the contractual terms in the second period. The prospect of renegotiation makes suppliers cautious about the information revealed in period one. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and highlight the role of information design for its implementation. We show that the buyer can achieve the full commitment surplus with the appropriate information d...
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作者：Hyndman, Kyle; Walker, Matthew J.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Newcastle University - UK
摘要：We conduct an ultimatum bargaining experiment but, rather than bargaining over money, subjects bargain over lottery tickets for a mutually exclusive prize. We find that proposers offer a significantly lower percentage of lottery tickets to responders than the equivalent offer when bargaining over money. In contrast, responders have a significantly higher acceptance threshold, which is consistent with responders being risk averse and possessing ex-post fairness concerns. This difference can be ...
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作者：Pangallo, Marco; Sanders, James B. T.; Galla, Tobias; Farmer, J. Doyne
作者单位：Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna; Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna; University of Manchester; University of Oxford; University of Oxford; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：Do boundedly rational players learn to choose equilibrium strategies as they play a game repeatedly? A large literature in behavioral game theory has proposed and experimentally tested various learning algorithms, but a comparative analysis of their equilibrium convergence properties is lacking. In this paper we analyze Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA), which generalizes fictitious play, best-response dynamics, reinforcement learning and also replicator dynamics. Studying 2 x 2 games for t...
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作者：Naono, Miharu
作者单位：Kyoto University
摘要：The bilingual game is a simple variant of a coordination game in which players can choose between two alternative languages, but also have the option of a bilingual strategy, which allows them to coordinate with speakers of both languages at some additional cost. In this paper, we introduce heterogeneity in this cost and show how it leads to the persistence of the bilingual strategy in equilibrium. This helps to explain phenomena such as people using multiple pieces of software that can achiev...
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作者：Bo, Inacio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; University of Lausanne
摘要：Lately, there has been an increase in the use of sequential mechanisms, instead of the traditional direct counterparts, in college admissions in many countries, including Germany, Brazil, and China. We describe these mechanisms and identify their shortcomings in terms of incentives and outcome properties. We introduce a new mechanism, which improves upon these shortcomings. Unlike direct mechanisms, which ask students for a full preference ranking over colleges, our mechanism asks students to ...
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作者：Hahn, Niklas; Hoefer, Martin; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent (the sender) that evaluates the secretary performance and one (the receiver) that makes the hiring decision. The sender signals the quality of the candidate to the hiring agent. Whenever the two agents' interests are not fully aligned, this induces an information transmission (signaling) challenge for the sender. We study the sender's optimization problem subject to ...
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作者：Besner, Manfred
摘要：Central to this note is the concept of disjointly productive players. Two players are disjointly productive if there is no synergy effect if one of these players joins a coalition containing the other. Our first new axiom states that the payoff to a player does not change when another player, disjointly productive in relation to that player, leaves the game. The second new axiom implies that if a player splits into two disjointly productive players who together contribute the same to the game ...
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作者：Nunez, Marina; Vidal-Puga, Juan
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Universidade de Vigo; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no cost. The source has some information (or technology), and agents in the same component as the source can reach this information for free. In other components, some agent must pay a unitary cost to obtain the information. We prove that the core of the derived information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern s...
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作者：Arjona, David Rojo; Sitzia, Stefania; Zheng, Jiwei
作者单位：University of Leicester; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; Lancaster University
摘要：We experimentally test whether increasing the salience of payoff-irrelevant focal points (Schelling, 1960) can counteract the negative impact of conflicts of interest on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience increases its relevance and, therefore, coordination success. When we vary label salience between subjects, we find support for this conjecture in games...
