Strategic information transmission with sender?s approval: The single-crossing case

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Semirat, Stephan; Forges, Francoise
• 署名单位: INRAE; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.004
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 242-263
• 关键词: Discrete cheap talk; participation constraints; Single-crossing

摘要

We consider games in which an informed sender first talks at no cost to a receiver; then, the latter proposes a decision and, finally, the sender accepts the proposal or exits . We make the following assumptions: the sender has finitely many types, the receiver's decision is real-valued, utility functions over decisions are concave, single-peaked and single-crossing, exit is damaging to the receiver. In this setup, it may happen that babbling equilibria necessarily involve exit. We nevertheless propose a constructive algorithm that achieves a pure perfect Bayesian equilibrium without exit in every game of the class considered.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.